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1. Introduction
Corporate bankruptcy can impose personal costs on the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO),
ranging from forced career change to loss of labor market capital and equity value. These costs
are of great interest to corporate finance because they can incentivize CEOs to hedge against
bankruptcy risk at the expense of shareholder value. For example, one finds references to this
hedging incentive in studies of large corporate cash balances (Bates et al., 2009), near-zero leverage
firms (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), and firms that could switch to low-risk investments when
approaching bankruptcy (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003; Eisdorfer, 2008). The concept of personal
costs of corporate bankruptcy is also used in the context of optimal design of nonexecutive labor
contracts (Berk et al., 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2013).
Notwithstanding its importance, evidence on CEO personal costs arising from corporate bankruptcy
in the US is sparse. Some evidence exists on CEO compensation losses associated with Chapter 11
filings in the 1980s (Gilson, 1989; Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). However, over the past decades,
Chapter 11 has evolved toward a more creditor-oriented process (Jiang et al., 2012; Ayotte et al.,
2013), which by itself can impact CEO personal costs of corporate bankruptcy. In this paper,
we provide large-sample evidence on CEO career and compensation changes in the modern era
of Chapter 11. With the exception of Eckbo and Thorburn (2003), who use Swedish tax returns
to show changes in CEO labor market income after bankruptcy filing, the type of longitudinal
employment and compensation change information that we analyze is largely new to the literature
on Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Hotchkiss et al., 2008).
Does the executive labor market punish CEOs who file for Chapter 11? The answer is likely
complex. On the one hand, the CEO could have paid insufficient attention to the firm’s operational
and financial policies, including a failure to restructure the untenable set of financial claims against
the firm. On the other hand, this criticism could be muted by a realization that forces beyond the
CEO’s control, such as technological and regulatory changes, also contribute to financial distress.
Moreover, the decision to file can be viewed positively by the labor market because it halts further
slide toward costly liquidation and adds valuable crisis management experience to the CEO’s skill
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set. The net effect of these considerations for CEO career opportunities and changes in CEO labor
market capital is a largely unresolved empirical question, which our evidence addresses.
In this paper, we trace CEO employment through bankruptcy and estimate the loss of labor
market capital by comparing the CEO’s compensation before and after bankruptcy. Our sample
consists of 322 Chapter 11 filings in the period 1996 to 2007 by large, publicly traded US companies.
We focus on the career changes of the incumbent CEO, defined as the CEO in charge of the firm
at the fiscal year-end three years prior to bankruptcy filing (event year -3). Moreover, we single
out the 18% of the incumbents who are company founders. This is somewhat higher than the 11%
founder CEOs reported by Fahlenbrach (2009) for large public US firms outside of bankruptcy.
For comparison, we also include the CEOs hired to replace the incumbents during the bankruptcy
event period from year -2 through the year after emergence (event year Emergence+1). One can
reasonably expect that the incumbent CEO is more likely to be held responsible for the firm’s
demise than a replacement CEO hired closer to or after filing. At the same time, a founder in-
cumbent can have firm-specific human capital that is valuable for the distressed firm (Anderson
and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Adams et al., 2009).
The analysis is performed in five steps. First, we determine to what extent the CEO continues
at the helm of the restructured firm or leaves over the bankruptcy event period. CEO turnover
is high. Of the 322 incumbents, 86% leave before year-end Emergence+1. The departures are
classified as either voluntary or forced, defined as performance-related or following pressure from
the board, shareholders, or creditors. We find that founder incumbents are marginally less likely
to be forced out than nonfounder incumbents. Moreover, forced turnover increases with fraud
allegations and with creditor control rights during bankruptcy. A channel for the latter effect
is covenants imposed by debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing lenders. Multivariate regressions
further indicate that CEOs with greater percentage share ownership are less likely to leave the
firm voluntarily, as if equity ownership provides an incentive to stay with the firm as it approaches
bankruptcy.
Second, for a CEO who leaves his position, we record any new employment within three years
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using public sources such as industry manuals, press releases, and social media. We positively
identify the employment or retirement for 81% of the 322 incumbent CEOs and classify the re-
maining 19% as retired. Approximately one-third of all incumbent CEOs leave for a new executive
position or remain CEO of the restructured firm after emergence. The remaining two-thirds leave
the executive labor market to assume nonexecutive directorships on corporate boards, become
consultants, or retire. The likelihood of leaving the executive labor market is positively associ-
ated with relatively poor operating performance, DIP financing, and allegations of financial fraud.
While incumbent CEOs are more likely to leave without assuming a new executive position than
replacement CEOs, no significant difference emerges in the full sample between founders and
nonfounders.
Third, we find the CEO’s compensation in his new career and compare that with his compen-
sation at the bankrupt firm. For CEOs who continue as executives at public firms, we collect the
new compensation from ExecuComp or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (proxy
statements and form 10-K). For those who become executives at private firms, we follow the lit-
erature and estimate the new compensation as the executive compensation for a public company
matched on two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry and size (Core et al., 1999;
Murphy, 1999; Harford and Li, 2007; Kaplan and Rau, 2010), adjusted by a 20% private-firm
discount (Gao et al., 2011; Gao and Li, 2015).
We compute the present value (PV) of the compensation change (new minus old) through age
65 as a measure of the effect of the bankruptcy event on the CEO’s labor market capital. As some
CEOs retire voluntarily, this PV represents an upper bound on the incumbent CEO’s change
in labor market capital due to bankruptcy. For incumbents (founders as well as nonfounders)
who maintain executive employment, the median estimated compensation change is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This holds regardless of whether the CEO stays with the restructured
firm or assumes an executive position at another firm. Thus, the executive labor market capital
of these incumbents is typically unaffected by bankruptcy filing. In contrast, incumbents who
leave the executive labor market experience a substantial compensation loss, with a median PV
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estimate of $7.2 million or 4.6 times the old compensation in constant 2009 dollars.
Fourth, we measure the CEO’s loss on his equity holdings in the bankrupt firm. For incumbents
who stay until the year of bankruptcy filing, the median equity value declines from $11 million in
year -3 to $2 million in year -1. Notwithstanding this drop, their median percent share ownership
stays constant at 3% over the pre-filing period. Because only about 15% of the incumbent CEOs
receive restricted stock awards, this suggests that they typically do not sell out prior to bankruptcy
filing.
We end the paper with a brief multivariate examination of CEO compensation at the distressed
firm prior to filing, comparing incumbents with replacement hires. Controlling for CEO and
firm-specific characteristics, we find that incumbents (founders as well as nonfounders) are paid
significantly more than replacement CEOs, suggesting the existence of a rent component in the
incumbents’ compensation. One of the key results of this paper, that the median compensation
does not change for incumbents who depart for new executive positions, suggests that this rent
component (if it exists) is not specific to the filing firm. That is, this subsample of departing CEOs
could generally be of a high quality relative to the replacements CEOs, for reasons that are not
captured by the regression determinants. We are unable to resolve whether or not the incumbents
who end up leaving the executive labor market earn rents specific to the filing firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample selection
procedure and our choice of CEO, firm, and bankruptcy characteristics for the cross-sectional
empirical analysis. We then proceed with presenting our evidence on CEO turnover and new
employment in Section 3 and 4, respectively, followed by the CEO compensation change and equity
value loss evidence in Section 5. Section 6 contains the compensation comparison of incumbents
and replacement CEOs, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Chapter 11 filings and empirical test strategy
This section describes the sample selection and defines the variables used in our empirical
analysis below.
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2.1. Sample selection
Our sample selection starts with 497 Chapter 11 filings in the 1996 to 2007 period by US firms
with book assets above $100 million (in constant 1980 dollars) from the Bankruptcy Research
Database of Professor Lynn LoPucki at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).
We require the firm to be publicly traded, the bankruptcy case to be resolved by year-end 2010
(eliminating five protracted cases), and information on CEO characteristics and compensation to
be available in the fiscal year prior to filing. These restrictions jointly eliminate 175 cases, for a
final sample of 322 bankrupt firms.
We track each sample firm over an event window that begins in year -3 relative to the fiscal
year of Chapter 11 filing (year 0). If the firm successfully reorganizes in Chapter 11, the event
window ends in the year after emergence (Emergence+1), where Emergence is the year that the
reorganization plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy court. If the firm is liquidated (liquidation)
or sold (acquisition) in bankruptcy instead of being reorganized, the event period ends with these
outcomes. This yields a total of 1,899 firm-year observations from the period 1993 through 2010.
Table 1 presents the annual distribution and characteristics of our sample firms. Dollar values
are in constant 2009 dollars throughout the paper. As expected, the number of filings is relatively
high over the two years following the market-wide economic decline in 2000. Moreover, filing firms
are relatively large, with average sales of $2.5 billion and total assets of $3.4 billion (both with
median of $0.8 billion) at the end of the year prior to filing (year -1).
****************** Insert Table 1 near here ******************
Table 1 further shows that the filing firm emerges from Chapter 11 as a stand-alone restructured
company in 205 cases (64%), and 85 firms (26%) are liquidated and another 32 firms (10%) are
acquired in bankruptcy. The duration of the bankruptcy proceedings, defined as the time between
filing and emergence, liquidation, or acquisition, is 17 months on average (median 13 months).
About half of the cases are resolved within 12 months of filing and 78% are resolved within 24
months. Thirty percent of the bankruptcies are prepacks. A prepack is a prepackaged bankruptcy
filing, in which the firm files a plan of reorganization jointly with its bankruptcy petition. These
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bankruptcy proceedings tend to be quicker (Tashjian et al., 1996; Thorburn, 2000), and the average
time in bankruptcy is only six months (median four months) for the prepacks in our sample. The
sample firms are distributed across a large number of two-digit SIC industries. The four largest
industries are communications (14%), business services (5%), primary metals (5%), and health
services (5%).
While not shown in the table, the sample firms struggle financially in the years leading up to
filing, with high leverage and poor operating performance compared with their industry peers. The
median leverage ratio (defined as total liabilities to total assets) is 82% in year -2 and 95% in year -1,
which is significantly higher than the industry median. Moreover, the industry-adjusted return on
assets [ROA, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
to total assets] is -3.5% and -5.8% in years -2 and -1, respectively, implying a significantly lower
operating performance than that of their industry competitors.
2.2. CEO, firm, and bankruptcy characteristics for the cross-sectional analyses
Throughout the paper, we use data from our sample firms to perform cross-sectional regressions
addressing key aspects of the CEO labor market reaction to financial distress and bankruptcy.
First, we estimate the determinants of CEO turnover and of continued executive employment at
the sample firm or at another firm. These probabilities address the existence of job opportunities
for the CEOs of bankrupt firms, but not their pay levels. Second, we estimate the determinants
of the CEO compensation changes around bankruptcy, both when the CEO remains with the
restructured firm and following departure from the bankrupt firm. This estimation addresses the
key question of the paper: the size and determinants of the change in the total CEO compensation
and value of labor-market capital around bankruptcy.
Table 2 defines the variables used in the regressions and their data sources, and Table 3 shows
mean and median values of the key CEO, firm, and bankruptcy characteristics in year -3. Much
as Gilson (1989) and Hotchkiss (1995), we focus the analysis on the CEOs in place in year -3,
here represented by the dummy variable Incumbent. Our main inferences remain unchanged if
we instead define an incumbent as being in place two years prior to filing. Moreover, we separate
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founder from nonfounder incumbents. In event year -3, the average CEO tenure is eight years
for founder incumbents and five years for nonfounder incumbents. The CEO’s tenure with the
firm is an alternative measure for his firm-specific human capital. However, including tenure as
an additional explanatory variable in the cross-sectional analysis does not materially affect the
results.
****************** Insert Tables 2 & 3 near here ******************
The CEO characteristics also include CEO age (Age), a dummy for the CEO being chairman of
the board (Chairman), and the percent of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO (Share ownership).
As shown in Table 3, relative to nonfounder incumbents, founders are slightly younger (50 versus
53 years), own more equity (14% versus 5%), and more often hold the chairmanship (74% versus
58%).
The firm characteristics include Size (log of total sales), as well as Cash (cash and short-term
investments) and Tangibility (net property, plant, and equipment), both normalized by total
assets. Moreover, Industry-adjusted ROA and Industry-adjusted leverage adjust the firm’s ROA
(EBITDA scaled by book assets) and leverage (total liabilities to book assets) with the two-digit
SIC industry median. Industry distress is a dummy variable indicating that the median stock
return in the firm’s two-digit SIC industry is below -30% (Opler and Titman, 1994; Acharya et al.,
2007). As shown in Table 3, 11% of the sample firms are in industries classified as distressed in
year -3.
Our analysis also controls for characteristics capturing the potential for creditor control in
bankruptcy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) warn that the CEO can implement shareholder-friendly
risk-shifting strategies in financial distress. In our context, if such risk shifting fails to avoid
bankruptcy, creditors bear the brunt of the costs and can hold the CEO personally responsible.
Creditors have the power to influence the decision to retain the CEO in Chapter 11, both through
voting and use of DIP loan contract provisions. To illustrate, in Recoton’s 2003 bankruptcy
filing, DIP lenders demanded replacement of the incumbent CEO with outsider Jerry Kalov and
included a covenant making removal of Kalov a default on the DIP facility. More generally, DIP
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lenders exert substantial power over the bankrupt firm’s day-to-day decisions through use of tight
covenants (Dahiya et al., 2003; Skeel, 2003; Li et al., 2013).
Different creditor classes can have different views of the value of keeping the CEO. For example,
suppliers trying to save valuable customer relations and secure continued business can use their
influence to retain the incumbent CEO. A case in point is the 2007 filing by Hancock Fabrics,
in which the suppliers formed an unsecured creditors’ committee to ensure that the pre-filing
CEO Jane Aggers was retained. In general, because post-petition claims enjoy administrative
claim status with priority over general unsecured claims in Chapter 11, suppliers often continue to
support their customers by extending short-term credit (Kolay et al., 2015). Moreover, suppliers
tend to experience a large reduction in value when their customers file for bankruptcy (Hertzel
et al., 2008).
To capture these potential effects, we use four dummy variables reflecting the strength of
various claim holders that can influence the bankruptcy process. Institutional ownership indicates
that institutional investors own more than 20% of the firm’s equity in the previous year, the sample
average in event year -1. Bond debt and Trade credit indicate that the bankrupt firm has public
bonds and non-interest-bearing debt (primarily trade credit), respectively, exceeding two-thirds of
total liabilities. Bond debt captures the potential for hedge funds and other distressed investors to
influence the restructuring process (Jiang et al., 2012). Trade credit, which is often found among
firms in the retail and construction sectors, identifies firms in which unsecured creditors have a
particular interest in the survival of the firm. DIP financing indicates that the firm receives
debtor-in-possession financing in Chapter 11. In our sample, the pairwise correlation between
DIP financing and Trade credit is low.
In addition, we include the dummy variables During bankruptcy, indicating the event window
from year 0 through the year of emergence (Emergence), Fraud, indicating financial fraud allega-
tions against the company, and Prepack, indicating that the firm has negotiated a prepackaged
bankruptcy filing. Firms filing prepacks tend to have higher going-concern value and debt recovery
rates than those selecting a regular (non-prepack) Chapter 11 filing, which in turn could affect
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equilibrium CEO compensation.
3. CEO turnover and creditor control rights
The probability that the incumbent CEO leaves the executive labor market around bankruptcy
filing is an important driver of his expected personal costs of corporate bankruptcy. Moreover, the
response of the CEO labor market to the bankruptcy event, and the resulting change in executive
labor market capital, likely depends on whether the CEO leaves voluntarily or is forced out. To
examine this issue, in this section, we provide turnover statistics and estimate the determinants
of forced and voluntary turnover, including the role played by creditor control rights.
3.1. CEO turnover statistics
We record information on CEO turnover and appointments throughout the reorganization pro-
cess, relying on SEC filings and, for firms that stop filing with the SEC after entering bankruptcy,
bankruptcydata.com and Factiva. Table 4 reports annual CEO departure and appointment fre-
quencies over the event period, separating incumbent and replacement CEOs. There are 322
incumbents, of which 58 are company founders, and 320 CEOs hired to replace the departing
executive, for a total of 642 CEOs in the sample. Over the event period (-2, Emergence+1), 144
firms replace a single CEO, 99 firms replace two CEOs, and 34 firms replace three or more CEOs.
****************** Insert Table 4 near here ******************
As shown in Column 5, 277 or 86% of the incumbents (83% of the founder incumbents) have
left the CEO position by the end of year Emergence+1. Thus, 14% of the incumbent CEOs
remain with the restructured firm after it has emerged from bankruptcy. In comparison, Gilson
(1989) reports that 29% of the incumbent CEOs remain with the firm throughout bankruptcy
restructuring, and Hotchkiss (1995) reports an incumbent CEO retention rate of 30%. The higher
retention rates reflect that these studies follow CEOs in place two year priors to filing, instead of
the three years used to define incumbents in our study.
Of the 320 replacement CEOs, 126 are internally promoted and 194 are hired from the out-
side. Media reports indicate that one-third of the external replacement CEOs are restructuring
9
specialists and two-thirds have prior experience as CEO. As reported in Column 6, 170 (53%) of
the replacement CEOs depart during the bankruptcy event period. In total, 447 of all sample
CEOs (incumbents and replacements) leave the sample firm (Column 4).
Of the 447 departing CEOs, 143 leave during the two years leading up to filing, 259 leave
during bankruptcy, and the remaining 45 depart in year Emergence+1. This translates into an
average annual turnover rate of 30% over the event period. This rate is comparable to that
reported elsewhere for firms in financial distress (Ayotte and Morrison, 2009; Jiang et al., 2012).
The turnover rate is highest during bankruptcy, with 39% of the CEOs replaced in an average
year. Prior to filing and after emergence, however, the annual turnover rate averages 22%, which
is similar to that reported for solvent firms (Huson et al., 2004; Jenter and Kanaan, 2014).
Table 5 lists the frequency distribution of the reasons for CEO turnover as stated in press
releases and news articles (Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al., 1988; Gilson, 1989; Denis and Denis,
1995). These sources identify the reason for departure for 91% of the CEOs who leave over the
bankruptcy event period. The most frequently stated reasons are personal (21%), liquidation or
acquisition (19%), retirement or normal succession (15%), and pressure from the board, share-
holders, or creditors (14%). We classify turnover as forced if it is performance-related or follows
pressure by the board, shareholders, or creditors. With this definition, 18% of all departures are
forced. Not surprisingly, the fraction of forced turnover is significantly higher for incumbents than
for replacement CEOs (21% versus 12%).
****************** Insert Table 5 near here ******************
The extant literature on CEO turnover uses a weaker definition of forced, adding cases in which
the departing CEO is under 60 years old and the departure is for personal reasons and to pursue
other interests (Denis and Denis, 1995; Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Yermack, 2006; Goldman
and Huang, 2014). In our sample, the average CEO age at departure is 55 years (56 years for
incumbents and 54 years for replacement CEOs) and three-quarters of the departing CEOs are
under 60 years old. Relaxing our strict definition of forced to also include cases in which the CEO
is under than 60 years old and resigns for personal reasons or leaves to pursue other interests
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(labeled “weakly forced” in Table 5) increases the fraction of forced departures from 18% to 44%
(47% for incumbents). To minimize the risk of falsely classifying a departure as forced (Denis and
Denis, 1995), we use the stricter definition of forced turnover in our analysis. However, our main
inferences concerning CEO turnover also hold for weakly forced turnover.
3.2. Determinants of forced and voluntary turnover
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from multinomial logit regressions for the probability of
CEO turnover. The dependent variable has three outcomes: voluntary turnover, forced turnover,
and no turnover (the reference outcome). The table presents three models, in which the second
model replaces Incumbent with Founder incumbent and Nonfounder incumbent. In the first two
models, the sample covers 1,187 firm-years from year -2 through Emergence+1 (237 voluntary and
66 forced CEO turnover firm-years). Because the decision to do a prepacked filing is endogenous
and can bias the other coefficients, the third model is limited to the 829 firm-years for non-prepack
filings. The regressions include Fama and French 12 (FF12) industry dummies.
****************** Insert Table 6 near here ******************
The probability of voluntary departure (the first column of each model) is significantly associ-
ated with three of the four CEO characteristics. That is, it increases with Age and decreases with
Chairman and Share ownership. A consistent interpretation is that older executives are more
inclined to withdraw from the distressed company rather than partake in the restructuring and
that relatively powerful CEOs are less likely to leave voluntarily.
Of the firm and bankruptcy characteristics, only Industry-adjusted ROA is strongly related
to the probability of voluntary departure. CEOs are more likely to voluntarily leave firms with
relatively weak operating performance (at the 1% level for the full sample in Models 1 and 2).
The significance of operating performance for CEO turnover complements extant evidence on CEO
turnover outside of bankruptcy (Huson et al., 2001).
The determinants of the probability of forced CEO turnover (second column of each model) are
significantly higher for incumbent than for replacement CEOs. This effect is driven by the non-
founder incumbents (the P-value for the difference of the coefficients for founder and nonfounder
11
incumbents is 0.056). One possible explanation is that founders have more firm-specific human
capital of value to the distressed firm than nonfounder incumbents. Another is that high equity
ownership allows entrenched founder incumbents to retain their positions longer than nonfounder
incumbents (the pairwise correlation between Founder incumbent and Share ownership is 0.22).
However, such an entrenchment effect, if present, is already controlled for by the inclusion of
Share ownership in Table 6.
Among the firm characteristics, forced turnover increases with Size, and it decreases with
Industry-adjusted ROA and Trade credit. Among the bankruptcy characteristics, forced departure
is significantly higher during bankruptcy proceedings, for firms with DIP financing, and when
financial fraud allegations have been lodged against the firm. The significance of Trade credit and
DIP financing in particular, and During bankruptcy in general, suggests that the probability of
forced turnover increases with the shift in control rights from shareholders to creditors as the firm
approaches bankruptcy.
The opposite impact of DIP financing and trade credit on forced turnover could seem surprising.
After all, firms relying heavily on trade credit financing, such as retail firms, could require a cash
infusion in the form of DIP financing during bankruptcy. However, while trade credit is the primary
component of Trade credit, this variable also contains other non-interest-bearing debts, such as
pension and tax liabilities (see Table 2). In our data, the correlation between an indicator for DIP
financing and trade credit to total liabilities is only 0.14, and it is even lower in Table 6 where
Trade credit is a dummy. What Table 6 shows is that the effect of Trade credit on forced turnover
is negative after controlling for the positive effect of DIP financing. This result is consistent
with trade creditors having developed strong economic ties with the firm and its CEO as part
of an efficient supply chain. Alternatively, dispersed trade creditors can simply face coordination
problems that weaken their bargaining power in bankruptcy and lowers the likelihood of forced
CEO departure.
As shown in Table 1, prepacks are typically resolved more quickly than regular Chapter 11
filings, perhaps reflecting that the firm is somewhat less distressed or has a less complex claim
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structure. Nevertheless, the indicator variable Prepack is insignificant in Models 1 and 2, sug-
gesting that CEOs of prepack firms have a similar likelihood of being forced out as CEOs of
non-prepack firms. However, eliminating the prepack firms from the regression (Model 3) re-
duces the significance of Size and Industry-adjusted ROA. This result is in part a consequence of
eliminating relatively profitable firms from the sample, which lowers the remaining cross-sectional
variation in firm profitability.
In sum, the likelihood of voluntary turnover increases with CEO age, and it decreases with
firm operating performance, CEO share ownership, and the chairmanship dummy. This evidence
suggests that relatively powerful CEOs and CEOs of firms performing relatively well are less likely
to leave voluntarily. Moreover, in the full sample, the likelihood of forced CEO turnover decreases
with operating performance and the trade credit dummy, and it is higher for nonfounder incum-
bents, when there are allegations of financial fraud, during bankruptcy, and for firms receiving
DIP financing. The decision to fire the CEO thus could be associated with the increase in creditor
control rights that results from bankruptcy filing.
4. Quo vadis? CEO new employment and career changes
The question posed in the title of this paper requires estimation of how bankruptcy filing
changes CEO employment and his compensation conditional on the employment change. Fig. 1
shows the basic structure that we use for this analysis. We begin this section by identifying and
describing the main determinants of three key CEO employment outcomes: (1) remain at the
restructured firm, (2) depart to another executive position, and (3) depart for no new executive
position. In Section 5, we estimate the conditional compensation changes and their determinants.
This analysis allows us to infer both the extent to which bankruptcy forces CEO career changes
and the costs of those changes.
****************** Insert Figure 1 near here ******************
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4.1. Identifying new employment
From Table 4, of the total sample of 642 incumbent and replacement CEOs, 447 leave their
executive position at the bankrupt firm. Moreover, proxy statements and 10-Ks show that 190
of the sample CEOs remain as top executives of the restructured firm at year-end Emergence+1.
We are unable to determine the departure status for five of the replacement CEOs. We further
eliminate 30 CEOs hired after emergence. As listed to the left in Fig. 1, this yields a sample of
322 incumbent CEOs, and 607 CEOs when including the replacements CEOs (in parentheses), for
the employment change analysis.
For CEOs who leave (lower branch in the figure), we search for new employment over the next
three years, including directorship at the restructured firm. The sources of this information include
the sample firms’ proxy statements and 10-Ks, corporate registries [Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
Corporate Register and Marquis Who’s Who in Finance and Business], news and press releases
(Factiva), and Internet searches (LinkedIn, Wikipedia, and Google). If we fail to find employment
information in any of these sources, we classify the CEO as having no new employment. This
search positively identifies career-related information for 81% of the incumbents and 83% when
including CEOs who remain with the restructured firm. These identification rates are high by the
extant literature tracking CEO career changes (Gilson, 1989; Fee and Hadlock, 2003, 2004; Desai
et al., 2006).
Fig. 1 summarizes the frequencies of various employment change categories for incumbent
CEOs and for the sample including replacement CEOs (in parentheses). From Table 4, 14%
of the incumbents remain with the restructured firm at year-end Emergence+1. Of the 86% of
incumbents who leave, 21% assume a new executive position (5% become CEOs at other public
firms, 8% become CEOs at private firms, 1% become nonCEO executives at public firms, and 6%
become nonCEO executives at private firms). Conditional on a new executive position, it takes on
average one year before the CEO joins another firm. Overall, a total of 32% of the 322 incumbent
CEOs (31% of the founders) maintain executive employment. Including replacement CEOs, the
percentage is 45%.
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The new firms hiring the departing CEOs tend to be of similar size as the bankrupt firm
in terms of total sales (whether public or private and measured at the years of departure and
rehiring). However, two-thirds of the new firms are in a different two-digit SIC industry. Thus,
only a minority of the CEOs who leave for a new executive position maintain their broad industry
specialization.
We next consider the 79% of the departing incumbent CEOs who leave the executive labor
market entirely (lowest branch in Fig. 1). These CEOs become nonexecutive directors (21%),
are consultants or self-employed (16%), or are classified as having no new employment (42%). As
to the last category, our data sources confirm this status for about half of the CEOs, primarily
indicating retirement or honorary chairman of the bankrupt firm. For the other half of the CEOs
classified as no new employment, we cannot be certain whether these CEOs fail to find new
employment or decide to pursue other personal (nonlabor market) interests. Having said that,
if someone assumes an executive position, it is likely to trigger information releases in company
reports, industry manuals, news articles, press releases, and websites, all of which are included
in our search. In sum, one-third of the incumbent CEOs, whether founder or nonfounder, retain
their position at the restructured firm or move to a new executive position at another firm.
4.2. Determinants of CEO career changes
Table 7 reports coefficients in multinomial logit regressions in which the dependent variable
has three outcomes: departure to a new executive position, departure without a new executive
position (leaving the executive labor market), and no departure (the reference outcome). The
sample and explanatory variables are the same as in Table 6. Eliminating the 17% of the sample
CEOs with missing information on new employment (Subsection 4.1) leaves inferences from the
regression analysis in this subsection unchanged.
****************** Insert Table 7 near here ******************
Beginning with the likelihood of departing to a new executive position, the only significant
variable is Trade credit, which receives a negative coefficient. The supply chain of a firm with
substantial trade credit can involve a relatively high level of firm-specific CEO capital. This could
15
explain why trade credit is associated with a lower probability that the CEO leaves. Moreover, the
insignificance of the remaining explanatory variables suggests that the characteristics determining
CEO executive labor market capital are similar across the old and the new firms, although only the
former are financially distressed. With this interpretation, one would also expect the equilibrium
CEO pay to be (conditionally) similar across old and new firms, which is what we find.
We next turn to the probability that the CEO departs with no new executive position (second
column of each model in Table 7). Because the CEO turnover probability is embedded in the
likelihood that the CEO leaves the executive labor market, several of the significant determinants
of this probability are the same as those found in Table 6. In particular, just as nonfounder
incumbents have a greater likelihood than replacement CEOs of being forced out, these CEOs have
a greater probability of leaving the executive labor market (Models 1 and 2). In the nonprepack
sample (Model 3), nonfounder CEOs also have a significantly greater likelihood than founder
CEOs of leaving the executive labor market.
Among the CEO and firm characteristics, the probability of departing without new executive
employment increases with Age, and it decreases with Share ownership and Industry-adjusted
ROA. The effect of age in part reflects retirements. In Table 6, voluntary turnover decreases with
CEO share ownership and operating performance, which in part drives the significance of these
variables in Table 7. Finally, the likelihood of leaving the executive labor market is higher when
allegations of financial fraud have arisen against the firm.
Finally, much as in Table 6 for the probability of forced CEO turnover, creditor control rights
appear to influence the probability of leaving the executive labor market in Table 7. However,
the effect now depends on whether the sample includes prepack firms. In the full sample, DIP
financing is positive and highly significant. In the nonprepack sample, During bankruptcy appears
to subsume this effect. The significance of During bankruptcy in the nonprepack sample reflects
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process with its active exercise of creditor rights.
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5. CEO bankruptcy costs: compensation change and equity loss
In this section, we follow the structure of the main outcomes in Fig. 1 and show the CEO’s
compensation change when he remains at the helm of the restructured firm, moves to a new firm,
or leaves the executive labor market altogether. Moreover, to estimate the CEO’s overall economic
costs, we show his loss of equity investment value in the distressed firm.
5.1. Measuring CEO compensation
For each CEO, we collect information on the CEO’s annual compensation, stocks beneficially
owned (percent and dollar value), and number and value of unexercised options. Compensation
data are available for 1,351 firm-years. Of these, 18% are from ExecuComp and 82% are obtained
manually from SEC filings (proxy statements and 10-K forms) via EDGAR (Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system). CEO compensation is defined as the sum of cash pay
(salary, bonus, long-term incentive plans, and other annual cash compensation), new equity grants
(restricted stock awards and Black and Scholes value of option grants), and all other compensation.
The value of restricted stock grants is from the compensation table in proxy statements and 10-
Ks. Option grants are valued using Black and Scholes and following Core and Guay (1999). Among
the parameter values, stock return volatility is measured as the annualized standard deviation of
daily stock returns over the fiscal year of the grant. For firms with fewer than 50 daily stock returns,
we use the median volatility for all ExecuComp firms in that year. The volatility is winsorized
at the 5th and 95th percentile each year. The dividend yield is the ratio of cash dividends to the
fiscal year-end stock price, and the risk-free rate is the Treasury bond yield corresponding to the
option’s expected time to maturity.
The compensation change is the difference between the CEO compensation at the new and old
(sample) firm. For the incumbent CEOs, the old compensation is averaged over years -3 and -2
to smooth temporary income fluctuations (when the income in year -3 is missing, it is the income
in year -2 only). For the replacement CEOs, the old compensation is averaged over the hiring
year and the next (or, when the income in the next year is missing, it is the income in the hiring
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year only). The idea is to smooth temporary influences caused by signing bonuses, partial-year
employment in the first year of hire, and restructuring bonuses. However, restricting the analysis
to the year after hiring does not affect the median old income for the replacement CEOs. Data to
compute the old compensation are missing for 63 CEOs, reducing the sample to 544 CEOs.
5.2. Estimating the CEO’s new compensation
Table 8 summarizes our estimation of the CEO’s new compensation, beginning with the 110
cases in Panel A, where the CEO’s new employment is at a public firm. For these cases, we
record the actual new CEO compensation from ExecuComp, proxy statements, and 10-Ks. When
the CEO remains with the restructured firm, we use the compensation averaged over years Emer-
gence+1 and Emergence+2. When the CEO departs to another public firm, the new compensation
is the average pay over the year of hiring and the next. Again, the idea is to smooth temporary
influences of signing and restructuring bonuses. However, the median of this average pay is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the median pay in the first full year of new employment.
****************** Insert Table 8 near here ******************
For the 123 cases in Panel B, where the CEO’s new employment is at a private firm, the new
compensation is estimated using the pay at a two-digit SIC industry and sales-matched firm in
ExecuComp, adjusted with a 20% private-firm discount (Gao et al., 2011; Gao and Li, 2015). The
sales of the matched firm must be within 30% of the private firm’s sales. If sales are missing for
the private firm, or no ExecuComp firm in the two-digit industry has sales within the 30% band,
the private firm is matched on assets using the same algorithm. If information on assets is also
missing, we match on the number of employees. Data for the private firm are from Capital IQ,
Factiva, Wikipedia, and Google. We match the firm in the year that the departed CEO joins the
new firm or, if the CEO stays with the restructured firm, in year Emergence+1. For the 28 CEOs
in Panel B who depart to a nonCEO executive position, we use the average nonCEO compensation
of the matched firm.
As a robustness check, we apply this matching procedure to the CEOs of public firms in Panel
A. The matching produces an estimated median CEO compensation that is indistinguishable
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from the actual median compensation of the public firm CEOs. This alleviates concerns that the
matching procedure produces an upward bias when applied to private firms.
For the 311 CEOs who leave the executive labor market (Panel C of Table 8), no standard
data sources identify the new income. As shown in Fig. 1, we categorize these CEOs into three
groups: nonexecutive director, consultant or self-employed, and no new employment.
For the 75 CEOs becoming nonexecutive directors, we use the following ordinary least squares
regression models to compute the new compensation, estimated across all ExecuComp firms over
the period 2005 to 2012 (in constant 2009 dollars). The models capture the finding of the broader
literature that firm size and industry are primary determinants of compensation (Frydman and
Jenter, 2010):
Y = 2.85 + 0.28Sales− 0.01Sales2 + IndFE (N = 12, 731, R2 = 0.23),(1)
Y = 1.93 + 0.51Assets− 0.02Assets2 + IndFE (N = 12, 740, R2 = 0.26), (2)
and
Y = 4.31 + 0.18Employees− 0.01Employees2 + IndFE (N = 12, 662, R2 = 0.19), (3)
where Y is the natural logarithm of a firm’s average director compensation (the sum of cash
and equity compensation, averaged across the nonexecutive directors in ExecuComp), the firm
characteristics are in natural logs, IndFE is two-digit SIC industry fixed effects, and N is firm-
years. All of the above coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our estimate of the
nonexecutive director compensation is the predicted value from regression Eq. (1). If information
on Sales is missing for the new firm, we use regression Eq. (2), and if both Sales and Assets are
missing, we use regression Eq. (3).
For the 66 sample CEOs who become consultants or self-employed, we assign an average income
of $500,000 in 2009 dollars. This estimate is based on consulting fees observed for a few departing
CEOs in our sample. For example, Andres Bande of Flag Telecom received $350,000 in 2002, and
Robert Cole of Lodgian, Inc. reveived $750,000 in 2011. Finally, for the 170 CEOs classified as
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receiving no new employment, we assign an income of zero. To the extent that we are missing
some future employment income, our estimated loss of labor market capital is biased upward for
this category of CEOs.
5.3. CEO compensation change from bankruptcy
In this subsection, we compute the present value of the compensation change until age 65.
This calculation uses a constant discount rate of 10% for all CEOs, accounts for the time between
the CEO’s departure and new employment, and includes severance pay. As shown in the Table 9,
28% of the departed CEOs receive severance, with a median of $1.6 million (three times old pay).
The extant literature shows a higher rate of severance pay of 40% to 50% for CEO turnover in
nondistressed firms (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Yermack, 2006; Goldman
and Huang, 2014). Our analysis does not include pension losses in bankruptcy. However, Sun-
daram and Yermack (2007) report that the median CEO of an S&P 500 firm has a pension worth
only 7% of his equity holdings.
****************** Insert Table 9 near here ******************
Table 10 reports the median compensation change (new minus old compensation), the PV of
the compensation change, and the multiple of PV to the old income. It shows the compensation
change for CEOs maintaining executive employment at the restructured or another firm. For the
incumbents, the median compensation and PV compensation changes are insignificantly different
from zero. This result holds whether the incumbent remains with the restructured firm or departs
for a new executive position. Moreover, while not shown in the table, whether the incumbent is a
founder or not makes no difference for the median income change or its present value.
****************** Insert Table 10 near here ******************
Regarding the PV multiples (Column 5), the median is insignificant for the pool of all in-
cumbents. However, the multiple is 1.1 times old income (significant at the 5% level) for the
incumbents remaining with the restructured firm. In sum, incumbents who remain in the execu-
tive labor market typically do not experience a compensation decline from bankruptcy.
The median replacement CEO experiences a significantly positive compensation change, whether
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in terms of percentage change or multiple. However, the difference in median between the incum-
bents and replacement CEOs is significant at the 5% level only for CEOs who depart for a new
executive position (Column 5). Thus, neither incumbents nor replacement CEOs appear to suffer
a labor market loss from bankruptcy conditional on maintaining executive employment.
The table also shows statistics for CEOs classified as leaving the executive labor market. As
indicated by the median percent compensation change of -100 in Column 3, the typical CEO in
this panel receives no new employment after departing the firm. Both incumbents and replacement
CEOs typically experience significant loss of executive labor market capital. For incumbents, the
median PV is -$7.2 million, or -4.6 times old income. For replacement CEOs, it is -$5.3 million
and -5.3 times old income. The difference in PV between incumbent and replacement CEOs is
statistically insignificant.
Table 10 suggests that CEOs who continue in executive employment are not tainted by the
bankruptcy event. In Table 11, we further test whether, for these CEOs, a difference exists in
the compensation change of incumbents and replacement CEOs and of founder and nonfounder
incumbents. The dependent variables are the percent compensation change and PV compensation
multiple (inferences are unchanged when measuring the dependent variable in dollar terms). We
use quantile (median) regressions to alleviate potential issues with outliers and control for firm
and bankruptcy characteristics.
****************** Insert Table 11 near here ******************
The first regression in Table 11 confirms the univariate result in Panel A of Table 10. As indi-
cated by Incumbent, the compensation change is lower for incumbent CEOs than for replacement
CEOs (at the 5% level of significance). However, this difference becomes insignificant after con-
trolling for firm characteristics in Column 2. The firm and bankruptcy characteristics themselves
are largely insignificant and therefore suppressed in this table for expositional simplicity. Also, no
statistically significant difference exists in the compensation change experienced by founder and
nonfounder incumbents.
In sum, for CEOs maintaining executive employment, we fail to find evidence of a significant
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compensation change difference between incumbent and replacement CEOs and between founder
and nonfounder incumbents. This suggests that CEO personal costs of corporate bankruptcy are
largely determined by the likelihood of continuing as executive (Table 7). In addition, executives
of bankrupt firms experience a loss of value of personal equity holdings in the firm.
5.4. CEO loss of equity invested in the bankrupt firms
In this subsection, we provide information on median share holdings (vested and unvested, not
including unexercised options) of the CEOs in our sample, using the year-end values reported by
the company. Fig. 2 plots the median share ownership in event time around bankruptcy filing,
from year -3 through year -1 and from Emergence+1 through Emergence+3. The median dollar
value of option holdings is zero over the event window and is excluded from the graph. The figure
also excludes the year of bankruptcy because the length of the bankruptcy proceedings varies
across firms. The figure displays the holdings of our sample CEOs as well as of industry peer
CEOs in ExecuComp matched on two-digit SIC code and size. Moreover, the figure shows the
holdings of the subset of incumbents in place at the bankrupt firm in year -1.
****************** Insert Figure 2 near here ******************
In Panel A, in year -3, the median CEO (all incumbents) holds $5.6 million of equity in the
sample firm. In comparison, peer CEOs own $7.0 million in the same event year. Moving forward
in event time, as the firm approaches bankruptcy, the median sample CEO’s equity holding drops
to $1.0 million in year -1 and that of the matched CEO remains largely constant. Singling out the
incumbents who stay with the firm through the end of year -1 or longer, the median CEO owns
$10.6 million in year -3, which drops to $2.2 million in year -1. Thus, incumbents who stay until
filing have typically greater initial equity holdings and, therefore, suffer greater loss of value.
As the sample firms emerge from bankruptcy and the CEOs receive new equity grants (Goyal
and Wang, 2014), the median value of CEO equity holdings increases to $2.2 million in Emer-
gence+1 and to $4.2 million two years later. As shown in the figure, these post-bankruptcy equity
holdings for CEOs of emerging firms approach the dollar value of the matched CEOs’ median
share holdings.
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Turning to the percentage share ownership in Panel B, the median in year -3 is 2.0% for the
total sample of incumbent CEOs and 3.0% for the subsample of incumbents that stay through
year -1. This difference is consistent with the finding in Table 6 that CEOs with relatively low
equity ownership are more likely to leave voluntarily, as if equity ownership provides an incentive
to stay with the firm.
Moreover, the median equity ownership declines to 1.5% in year -1 for the total CEO sample
and remains relatively constant at 0.6% for the industry peers. However, for the incumbents
who stay on as CEOs through year -1, the median percentage equity ownership does not decline.
Instead, it increases slightly from 3.0% to 3.2% over the event period year -3 through year -1.
Because only about 15% of the incumbent CEOs receive restricted stock awards in the pre-filing
years, this suggests that the median CEO does not sell out when approaching bankruptcy.
While we do not study insider trades directly, our evidence of relatively stable equity holdings
by incumbent CEOs who remain with the distressed firm is consistent with Loderer and Sheehan
(1989). They also report that corporate insiders do not typically reduce their equity ownership
prior to Chapter 11 filing. Our evidence, however, appears to contradict Seyhun and Bradley
(1997), who find significant net sales by top executives in the years surrounding bankruptcy filing.
An interesting question, which goes beyond this paper, is whether our evidence reflects stronger
enforcement of insider trading laws in our more recent sample period.
6. CEO compensation prior to filing
Table 12 provides estimates of cross-sectional determinants of the CEO compensation at the
sample firm prior to Chapter 11 filing. The first two columns model the level of compensation and
the last two columns model the proportion of the compensation paid in cash. We use this table
to examine whether incumbents (founders and nonfounders) earn executive labor market rents
relative to replacement CEOs.
****************** Insert Table 12 near here ******************
Among the significant characteristics in Table 12, pre-filing CEO compensation increases with
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Size and Cash, both of which captures higher pay at larger firms. Also, as expected, pre-filing
compensation tends to decrease with Industry distress, reflecting generally lower CEO pay in
severely distressed industries (median stock return below -30%). Moreover, pre-filing compensation
is lower in firms that undertake prepackaged filings, when the proportion of the compensation
that is paid in cash is also higher. A consistent interpretation is that prepacks are executed by
restructuring specialists who tend to be paid less than regular CEOs and with a greater proportion
of cash.
Furthermore, pre-filing compensation is decreasing in CEO age and the fraction of the com-
pensation paid in cash is higher the older the CEO. Finally, pre-filing compensation tends to be
higher in firms subsequently facing allegations of financial fraud. Some fraud allegations include
a charge that the firm has overstated its income, which by itself leads to higher compensation.
The dummy variable Incumbent is positive and highly significant in Column 1. This suggests
that incumbent CEOs have higher pre-filing average compensation than replacement CEOs after
controlling for CEO, firm, and industry characteristics. Moreover, as shown in Column 2, this
effect is present both for founder and nonfounder incumbents (the difference between these two
groups is statistically insignificant, with a P-value of 0.134). This evidence is consistent with the
existence of a rent component in the incumbents’ compensation not accounted for by the other
regressors in Table 12.
The median incumbent CEO who ends up moving to a new executive position does not ex-
perience a change in compensation. This suggest that the rent component in the compensation
of these relatively successful incumbents is not firm-specific. CEOs who depart to another ex-
ecutive position prior to filing could simply be highly skilled in general relative to the incoming
replacements CEOs. As to the remaining incumbents, however, the evidence is insufficient to
determine whether the rent component is firm-specific, which it would have to be to reflect CEO
overpayment.
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7. Conclusion
How large are CEO personal costs from corporate bankruptcy? Are filing CEOs punished by
the executive labor market? Is CEO turnover influenced by creditor control rights? We provide
some first, large-sample empirical evidence regarding these complex empirical questions. We study
CEO income and wealth losses from Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by publicly traded US firms,
focusing on incumbent CEOs (in place three years prior to filing). Moreover, we identify potential
effects of the incumbent being the company founder.
A major contribution of our empirical analysis is to identify executive employment after leaving
the bankrupt firm, which has been largely missing in the literature on Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Cross-sectional regressions show how CEO, firm, and bankruptcy characteristics are associated
with the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO turnover, as well as the likelihood that the
incumbent CEO departs to an executive position at another firm. Moreover, we estimate the
present value compensation change until age 65, and we provide a perspective on the compensation
contract of incumbents by comparing it with that of replacement CEOs.
CEO turnover, both forced and voluntary, is high around bankruptcy filing and, as expected,
negatively associated with industry-adjusted operating performance (return on assets). Voluntary
departure is positively associated with CEO age and negatively associated with CEO chairmanship
and shareholdings in the distressed firm, as if high equity ownership incentivizes CEOs to stay.
Forced CEO turnover is higher in the presence of fraud allegations. Founder incumbents are
marginally less likely to be forced out than nonfounder incumbents, possibly because the former
have more firm-specific human capital of value to the distressed firm.
We find that one-third of the incumbent CEOs maintain executive employment after bankruptcy,
either at a new firm or at the restructured firm emerging from bankruptcy. The remaining two-
thirds of incumbents leave the executive labor market. Of those who leave, some become nonexec-
utive corporate directors or consultants, while others retire. As expected, the likelihood of leaving
the executive labor market decreases with the firms industry-adjusted profitability.
Creditor control rights appear to influence CEO personal costs of corporate bankruptcy. As
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expected, forced turnover is higher during bankruptcy. More important, CEOs of firms receiving
DIP financing are more likely to be forced out, sometimes as a consequence of the exercise of DIP
financing covenants, and to leave the executive labor market. Moreover, CEOs of firms with large
trade credits are less likely to be forced out and more likely to remain with the restructured firm,
possibly reflecting strong economic ties as part of an efficient supply chain.
Another key finding is that incumbents who maintain executive employment experience a
median estimated compensation change of zero. This result holds whether the CEO stays with
the restructured firm or assumes an executive position at another firm. In other words, these
executives appear to maintain their labor market capital in spite of bankruptcy. In contrast,
incumbents leaving the executive labor market experience large compensation losses. The median
estimated compensation loss for this group equals five times the pre-departure income (a median
loss until age 65 of $7 million).
After adjusting for CEO and firm-specific factors, and conditional on maintaining executive
employment either at the restructured firm or at a new firm, we find no difference in the compen-
sation change around bankruptcy between incumbent and replacement CEOs. Also, no difference
emerges in the conditional compensation change between founder and nonfounder incumbents. In
sum, CEO personal costs of corporate bankruptcy, as measured here, are primarily determined by
whether or not the CEO leaves the executive labor market.
CEO equity losses prior to Chapter 11 filing are substantial. Incumbent CEOs in place at year-
end prior to filing suffer a decline in median equity value of $9 million. In the year of filing, when
fiduciary restrictions most likely prevent the CEO from selling equity, there is a further median loss
of $2 million, for a total wealth loss of $11 million. No evidence exists that the median incumbent
CEO reduces his percentage stock ownership during the slide toward bankruptcy filing.
Do incumbent CEOs earn firm-specific rents prior to filing? On the one hand, we find that
incumbents have significantly higher average pre-filing compensation than replacement CEOs.
This effect, which is present for both founder and nonfounder incumbents, holds after controlling
for CEO, firm, and industry characteristics, and it suggests the presence of a rent component in
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incumbents’ pre-filing compensation. On the other hand, because incumbents who depart for new
executive positions do not experience a compensation change at the new firm, these executives
could be paid more than the replacement CEOs simply because they are better managers. As to
the remaining departing incumbents, however, our evidence is insufficient to determine whether
the rent component is specific to the bankrupt firm.
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15; 5% (23; 5%) in Emergence +1 or become  
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Departing CEOs 17; 6% (32; 7%)
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Nonexecutive director
58; 21% (81; 18%)
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employed
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220; 79% (336; 75%) 43; 16% (71; 16%) investigation, in prison, died
57; 18% (78; 13%) of all CEOs
No new employment
119; 43% (184; 41%)
No trace in the public domain
62; 19% (106; 17%) of all CEOs
Fig. 1. Chief executive officer (CEO) new employment around bankruptcy. The figure lists the number and
percent of CEOs across different new employment categories for the 322 incumbent CEOs (in place at the end of
year -3) and, in parentheses, the total sample of 607 incumbent and replacement CEOs. The departing CEOs leave
their position before year-end Emergence+1. Replacement CEOs hired in year Emergence+1 are excluded. The
information is from industry manuals, proxy filings, press releases, and social media. The sample contains 322 large
public US firms filing for Chapter 11 in the 1996 to 2007 period.
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Panel A: Median value of CEO share ownership (in millions of dollars)
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Fig. 2. Median chief executive officer (CEO) share ownership around bankruptcy filing. The figure shows the
median CEO share ownership in the sample firm in event time prior to bankruptcy filing (event year 0) and after
emergence from bankruptcy. In the figure, Bankruptcy includes all years from filing through emergence. Panel
A shows the value in millions of dollars, and Panel B shows the percent of shares outstanding. The figure plots
the median share ownership for three groups: all sample CEOs, the subset of incumbent CEOs who remain at
the end of year -1, and CEOs of peer firms in ExecuComp matched on two-digit standard industry classification
(SIC) industry and sales (if no ExecuComp firm in the two-digit SIC industry has sales within 30%, the match uses
one-digit SIC industry and sales). Data sources are ExecuComp, 10Ks, and proxy filings. The sample contains 313
large public US firms filing for Chapter 11 in the 1996 to 2007 period. After emergence, the sample is restricted to
113 firms that emerge from bankruptcy as public firms.
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Table 1
Annual distribution of sample bankruptcy filings and firm characteristics.
The table shows mean and median values of sales and book value of total assets in the year prior
to bankruptcy filing (millions of constant 2009 US dollars). A prepack is a prepackaged bankruptcy
filing, in which the firm files a plan of reorganization jointly with its bankruptcy petition. The outcome
Emerge describes a firm that emerges from Chapter 11 as an independent restructured company with
a reorganization plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The outcome Liquidate (Acquired) describes
firms that were liquidated piecemeal (acquired as a going concern) in Chapter 11. Duration is the
number of months from bankruptcy filing to any of the three outcomes. Forty-eight percent of the cases
are resolved within 12 months and 78% within 24 months. Prepacks have an average duration of six
month (median four months). The sample contains 322 large public US firms filing for Chapter 11 from
1996 to 2007.
Filing Sales (dollars) Total assets (dollars) Duration Percent Outcome (percent)
year N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median prepacks Emerge Liquidate Acquired
1996 7 1,972 832 829 593 8.5 4.5 43 43 43 14
1997 13 1,665 641 1,274 464 23.1 17.5 31 85 15 0
1998 25 728 389 752 503 19.3 14.1 28 68 24 8
1999 32 1,320 641 1,655 842 16.3 9.4 38 59 34 6
2000 51 1,448 779 1,481 633 22.9 19.6 22 57 31 12
2001 58 4,051 805 4,164 1,346 17.8 13.1 17 53 36 10
2002 54 3,846 1,009 7,326 1.195 13.2 8.4 46 63 19 18
2003 33 1,151 741 2,180 778 15.0 9.7 30 73 18 9
2004 16 1,381 561 1,585 766 12.2 10.2 38 88 13 0
2005 17 5,854 1,017 9,194 770 17.7 16.7 12 71 18 12
2006 7 2,244 1,179 1,859 497 9.2 5.5 71 100 0 0
2007 9 777 414 4,178 705 10.2 11.6 33 44 56 0
All 322 2,468 772 3,450 847 16.9 12.8 30 64 26 10
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Table 2
Definitions of variables used in the analysis of chief executive officer (CEO) personal costs of corporate bankruptcy.
The sample contains 642 CEOs of 322 large public US firms filing for Chapter 11 in the 1996 to 2007 period. Year 0 denotes the year
of bankruptcy filing. BRD is Bankruptcy Research Database, BD is BankruptcyData.com, Bcy plans is bankruptcy plans, CapIQ is
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ, and proxies is proxy statements. The sources for bankruptcy plans are BankruptcyData.com, 8Ks,
and US bankruptcy courts. The 10Ks, 8Ks, and proxy statements are from EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
system), and the 13Fs are from Thomson Reuters Ownership Databases.
Variable name Definition Source
CEO characteristics
Age CEO age in years. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Chairman Dummy indicating that the CEO is chairman of the board. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Share ownership Percent of the sample firm’s common shares owned by the CEO. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Incumbent CEO in place at end of fiscal year -3 relative to year of filing. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Founder incumbent Dummy indicating that the incumbent CEO is the company founder. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Nonfounder incumbent Dummy indicating that the incumbent CEO is not the company founder. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Replacement CEO appointed at the sample firm in year -2 to Emergence+1. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Forced turnover Dummy indicating that the departure is performance-related or follows pressure by
the board, shareholders, or creditors
10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Weakly forced turnover Forced turnover plus cases in which the CEO is under 60 years old and leaves for
personal reasons or to pursue other interests.
10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Voluntary turnover Dummy indicating that the departure is not forced. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
CEO compensation variables
Cash compensation Sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plans, and other cash compensation. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Equity grants Total value of restricted stock and options granted. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Total compensation Sum of cash compensation and equity grants. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Proportion cash pay Fraction of the total compensation paid in cash. ExecuComp, 10Ks, proxies
Compensation change Difference between the old and new compensation. The old compensation at the
sample firm is measured in year -3 or, if missing, year -2 for incumbent CEOs and
the first two years of employment for replacement CEOs. Estimation of the new
compensation is explained in Table 8.
PV compensation change Present value of the compensation change through age 65, discounted at a 10% rate,
and adjusted for severance and time to new employment.
Contractual severance Separation pay based on contract. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
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Variable name Definition Source
Discretional severance Discretional separation pay including lump-sum cash pay, loan forgiveness, adjust-
ment to pension benefits, consulting contract, and equity incentives.
10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Severance Sum of contractual and discretional severance. 10Ks, proxies, Factiva
Sample firm characteristics
Size Logarithm of total sales in millions of 2009 dollars. Compustat, 10Ks
Industry-adjusted ROA Firm return on assets (ROA) [ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization (EBITDA) to book assets] minus the median ROA of Compustat
firms in the two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry.
Compustat, 10Ks
Industry-adjusted leverage Firm leverage (defined as the ratio of total liabilities to book assets) net of the median
leverage for Compustat firms in the two-digit SIC industry.
Compustat, 10Ks
Cash Ratio of cash and short-term investment to book assets. Compustat, 10Ks
Tangibility Ratio of net plant, property, and equipment (PP&E) to book assets. Compustat, 10Ks
Industry distress Dummy indicating that the median stock return in the two-digit SIC industry is less
than -30% in that year.
Compustat
Institutional ownership Dummy indicating that institutional investors own at least 20% of the firm’s shares. 13Fs
Bond debt Dummy indicating that the face value of bonds is at least two-thirds of the firm’s
total liabilities.
Bcy plans, Compustat, CapIQ
Trade credit Dummy indicating that the total liabilities net of bank loans and bonds are at least
two-thirds of the firm’s total liabilities.
Bcy plans, Compustat, CapIQ
Bankruptcy characteristics
Emergence Confirmation of the reorganization plan by the bankruptcy court, after which the
firm emerges as an independent company.
BRD, BD, Bcy plans
During bankruptcy Dummy indicating the year of filing (event year 0) through the year of emergence
(Emergence).
BRD, BD, Bcy plans
Prepack Dummy indicating that a reorganization plan is filed jointly with the bankruptcy
petition.
BRD, BD, Bcy plans
DIP financing Dummy indicating that the firm receives debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. BRD, BD, Bcy plans, Factiva
Fraud Dummy indicating financial fraud allegations against the company. BRD
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Table 3
Summary statistics for variables used in the cross-sectional analysis.
The statistics are measured at the end of year -3 (end of year -2 for three firms that went public that
year). All variables are defined in Table 2. The sample contains 322 large public US firms filing for
Chapter 11 from 1996 to 2007.
N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Incumbent CEOs
Age 317 52.6 8.7 31 53 83
Chairman 322 0.61 0.49 0 1 1
Share ownership 268 7.1 12.2 0.0 1.9 88.5
Founder incumbent 322 0.18 0.38 0 0 1
Founder incumbents
Age 57 50.4 10.6 31 51 83
Chairman 58 0.74 0.44 0 1 1
Share ownership 49 14.3 15.3 0.0 9.5 72.0
Nonfounder incumbents
Age 260 53.0 8.1 33 53 79
Chairman 264 0.58 0.49 0 1 1
Share ownership 219 5.4 10.8 0.0 1.3 88.5
CEO compensation variables
Cash compensation 294 1,451 2,270 0 831 24,670
Equity grants 294 4,246 25,994 0 220 432,703
Total compensation 294 5,697 27,093 0 1,409 447,467
Proportion cash pay 294 0.67 0.35 0 0.76 1
Sample firm characteristics
Size 294 6.49 1.72 -0.36 6.63 10.77
Industry-adjusted ROA 293 -0.03 0.11 -0.69 -0.02 0.24
Industry-adjusted leverage 295 0.23 0.31 0.57 0.28 2.67
Cash 295 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.70
Tangibility 294 0.36 0.23 0.00 0.34 0.89
Industry distress 322 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Institutional ownership 322 0.45 0.50 0 0 1
Bond debt 279 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Trade credit 280 0.18 0.39 0 0 1
Bankruptcy characteristics
Prepack 322 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
Fraud 322 0.06 0.23 0 0 1
DIP financing 322 0.69 0.46 0 1 1
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Table 4
Chief executive officer (CEO) departures and replacements around bankruptcy filing.
The table shows the number of sample firms, incumbent CEOs, and CEOs who enter and leave the sample
around bankruptcy filing (year 0). The sample contains 322 large public US firms filing for Chapter 11
from 1996 to 2007, with a total of 642 unique CEOs. A CEO enters the sample by being appointed CEO
and exits by leaving the CEO position at the sample firm. There are 322 incumbent CEOs (in place at
the end of year -3, of which 58 are company founders) and 320 replacement CEOs. Of the replacement
CEOs, 126 are internally promoted. Media describe 68 of the 194 replacement CEOs hired externally as
restructuring specialists. Before bankruptcy, three firms went public in year -2. During bankruptcy, of
the 322 firms, 84 emerge in year 0, 70 in Filing+1, 37 in Filing+2, and 14 in Filing+3 through Filing+8,
for a total of 205 firms that emerge from bankruptcy as a stand-alone restructured company. In addition,
59 firms are liquidated or acquired in year Filing+1, 39 in year Filing+2, and 19 in Filing+3 through
Filing+8, for a total of 118 liquidated or acquired firms. There are a total of 62 firm-years for the 33
firms in the period Filing+3 through Filing+8. Information is missing for 15 replacement CEOs in year
Emergence+1.
CEOs who depart
Sample Incumbent Replacement Incumbent Replacement
firms CEOs CEOs All CEOs CEOs
Event year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Before bankruptcy
-3 319 322
-2 322 262 60 60 60 0
-1 322 193 83 83 69 14
Subtotal before bankruptcy 143 143 129 14
During bankruptcy
Filing (year 0) 322 138 98 98 55 43
Filing+1 238 99 33 91 39 52
Filing+2 109 70 12 50 29 21
Filing+3 through Filing+8 33 4 64 20 6 14
Subtotal during bankruptcy 147 259 129 130
After emergence
Emergence+1 205 45 30 45 19 26
Total 320 447 277 170
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Table 5
Stated reasons for chief executive officer (CEO) turnover around bankruptcy filing.
The table shows reasons for CEO turnover for the 447 CEOs who depart during the event period (-2,
Emergence+1) and were hired prior to Emergence+1. The reasons are as reported in news and company
press releases. Forced turnover includes performance-related reasons and departures due to pressure from
the board, shareholders, and creditors. Weakly forced turnover also includes cases in which the CEO is
under 60 years old and resigns for personal reasons or to pursue other interests. The P-value shows the
significance of the difference in the fraction of turnover between incumbent and replacement CEOs. The
447 CEOs represent 277 firms, from the total sample of 642 CEOs and 322 large public US firms filing
for Chapter 11 in 1996-2007. Miscellaneous reasons include end of transition period, finish restructuring
the company, return to own company, and investigation or inquiry by a special committee.
All CEOs Incumbent CEOs Replacement CEOs P-value
Reason for CEO departure N Percent N Percent N Percent of difference
Personal reasons 93 21 62 22 31 18 (0.295)
Pursue other interests 50 11 26 9 24 14 (0.124)
Retirement or normal succession 68 15 57 21 11 6 (0.000)
Death or illness 2 0 1 0 1 1 (0.727)
Performance-related 16 3 13 5 3 2 (0.106)
Pressured by the board, shareholders,
and creditors 63 14 45 16 18 10 (0.000)
Liquidation or acquisition 84 19 41 15 43 25 (0.006)
Miscellaneous 29 6 8 3 21 12 (0.000)
No reason given 42 9 24 9 18 11 (0.400)
Total 447 100 277 100 170 100
Forced turnover 79 18 58 21 21 12 (0.021)
Weakly forced turnover 198 44 131 47 67 39 (0.104)
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Table 6
Determinants of the probabilities of forced and voluntary turnover around bankruptcy.
The table shows coefficient estimates from multinomial logit regressions for the probabilities of chief executive officer
(CEO) turnover over the event period (-2, Emergence+1), in firms filing for Chapter 11 in 1996-2007. The dependent
variable has three outcomes: voluntary turnover, forced turnover, and no turnover (the baseline outcome). Included
but not reported are Fama and French 12 industry dummies and the regression constant term. The sample contains
1,187 firm-years for 314 unique firms, of which 829 firm-years represent non-prepack filings. Standard errors are
in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The P-values
in parentheses are from a χ2 test for the difference in the coefficients for Founder incumbent and Nonfounder
incumbent. All variables are defined in Table 2.
Full sample Full sample Non-prepack filings only
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
Variable Voluntary Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary Forced
CEO characteristics
Age 0.037∗∗∗ 0.002 0.036∗∗∗ -0.000 0.041∗∗∗ -0.011
[0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.019] [0.013] [0.024]
Chairman -0.468∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.459∗∗∗ 0.070 -0.463∗∗ -0.207
[0.167] [0.316] [0.167] [0.320] [0.212] [0.377]
Share ownership -0.028∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.030∗∗ 0.007
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012]
Incumbent 0.318∗ 1.192∗∗∗
[0.186] [0.353]
Founder incumbent 0.119 0.386 -0.070 0.171
[0.287] [0.559] [0.380] [0.688]
Nonfounder incumbent 0.359∗ 1.335∗∗∗ 0.401 1.373∗∗∗
[0.191] [0.359] [0.245] [0.429]
Firm characteristics
Size -0.025 0.272∗∗ -0.026 0.273∗∗ -0.008 0.230∗
[0.063] [0.106] [0.063] [0.106] [0.076] [0.119]
Industry-adjusted ROA -1.830∗∗∗ -2.629∗∗ -1.849∗∗∗ -2.658∗∗ -1.759∗ -3.022∗
[0.677] [1.126] [0.678] [1.137] [0.929] [1.620]
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.075 0.616∗ 0.069 0.597∗ -0.042 0.666
[0.183] [0.319] [0.183] [0.321] [0.230] [0.419]
Cash -1.147 0.507 -1.108 0.530 -1.042 -0.747
[0.852] [1.438] [0.852] [1.451] [1.046] [1.798]
Tangibility -0.011 -0.514 0.021 -0.348 0.102 0.499
[0.401] [0.802] [0.403] [0.813] [0.561] [1.078]
Industry distress -0.207 -0.134 -0.215 -0.142 -0.119 -0.411
[0.168] [0.300] [0.169] [0.300] [0.206] [0.364]
Institutional ownership -0.207 -0.134 -0.215 -0.142 -0.119 -0.411
[0.168] [0.300] [0.169] [0.300] [0.206] [0.364]
Bond debt 0.179 0.100 0.161 0.064 0.063 -0.519
[0.228] [0.414] [0.228] [0.419] [0.314] [0.558]
Trade credit -0.056 -0.815∗∗ -0.062 -0.836∗∗ -0.211 -1.064∗∗
[0.202] [0.378] [0.202] [0.378] [0.246] [0.456]
Bankruptcy characteristics
During bankruptcy 0.078 1.258∗∗∗ 0.086 1.290∗∗∗ 0.276 1.614∗∗∗
[0.175] [0.306] [0.175] [0.307] [0.214] [0.376]
Prepack 0.317∗ 0.030 0.328∗ 0.064
[0.173] [0.338] [0.173] [0.340]
DIP financing 0.315 1.059∗∗ 0.329 1.112∗∗∗ 0.149 1.598∗∗∗
[0.209] [0.422] [0.209] [0.430] [0.298] [0.607]
Fraud 0.544 1.525∗∗∗ 0.552 1.618∗∗∗ 0.436 2.439∗∗∗
[0.360] [0.493] [0.361] [0.496] [0.485] [0.635]
P-value, Founder incumbent
versus Nonfounder incumbent (0.357) (0.056) (0.180) (0.056)
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.084 0.102
Firm-years 1,187 1,187 829
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Table 7
Determinants of the probabilities of chief executive officer (CEO) employment change around bankruptcy filing.
The table shows coefficient estimates from multinomial logit regressions for the probabilities of chief executive
officer (CEO) turnover and new executive employment after departure over the event period (-2, Emergence+1), in
firms filing for Chapter 11 in 1996-2007. The dependent variable has three outcomes: turnover with new executive
position, turnover with no new executive position, and no turnover (the baseline outcome). Included but not
reported are Fama and French 12 industry dummies and the regression constant term. The sample contains of
1,187 firm-years for 314 unique firms, of which 829 firm-years represent non-prepack filings. Standard errors are
in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The P-values
in parentheses are from a χ2 test for the difference in the coefficients for Founder incumbent and Nonfounder
incumbent. All variables are defined in Table 2.
Full sample Full sample Non-prepack filings only
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
Executive No new Executive No new Executive No new
Variable position position position position position position
CEO characteristics
Age -0.013 0.042∗∗∗ -0.016 0.041∗∗∗ -0.027 0.042∗∗∗
[0.019] [0.011] [0.019] [0.011] [0.026] [0.013]
Chairman -0.421 -0.342∗∗ -0.395 -0.331∗ -0.454 -0.401∗
[0.285] [0.171] [0.287] [0.172] [0.389] [0.211]
Share ownership -0.015 -0.018∗∗ -0.011 -0.016∗∗ -0.020 -0.015∗
[0.017] [0.008] [0.017] [0.008] [0.023] [0.009]
Incumbent -0.218 0.730∗∗∗
[0.306] [0.195]
Founder incumbent -0.694 0.438 -0.581 0.114
[0.547] [0.293] [0.731] [0.378]
Nonfounder incumbent -0.134 0.788∗∗∗ 0.075 0.800∗∗∗
[0.313] [0.199] [0.440] [0.244]
Firm characteristics
Size -0.007 0.060 -0.007 0.058 -0.110 0.078
[0.120] [0.061] [0.119] [0.061] [0.157] [0.072]
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.650 -2.504∗∗∗ -0.671 -2.521∗∗∗ 0.369 -2.827∗∗∗
[1.194] [0.682] [1.192] [0.684] [1.748] [0.911]
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.382 0.096 0.358 0.087 0.424 -0.036
[0.295] [0.189] [0.296] [0.189] [0.395] [0.235]
Cash -2.300 -0.224 -2.127 -0.184 -1.161 -0.525
[1.739] [0.812] [1.732] [0.812] [2.203] [0.981]
Tangibility -0.167 -0.024 -0.125 0.031 0.421 0.198
[0.686] [0.416] [0.689] [0.419] [1.026] [0.572]
Industry distress -0.690 0.007 -0.647 0.017 -1.029 0.036
[0.487] [0.263] [0.489] [0.264] [0.678] [0.307]
Institutional ownership -0.187 -0.226 -0.197 -0.237 -0.363 -0.169
[0.292] [0.170] [0.293] [0.170] [0.379] [0.203]
Bond debt 0.036 0.233 0.015 0.210 -0.613 0.081
[0.374] [0.233] [0.374] [0.233] [0.600] [0.304]
Trade credit -1.116∗∗ -0.010 -1.118∗∗ -0.017 -1.554∗∗∗ -0.183
[0.441] [0.200] [0.441] [0.200] [0.587] [0.238]
Bankruptcy characteristics
During bankruptcy 0.363 0.321∗ 0.380 0.331∗ 0.708∗ 0.562∗∗∗
[0.293] [0.174] [0.294] [0.174] [0.390] [0.208]
Prepack 0.391 0.221 0.401 0.236
[0.289] [0.180] [0.291] [0.181]
DIP financing -0.184 0.694∗∗∗ -0.154 0.715∗∗∗ 0.323 0.578∗
[0.338] [0.221] [0.340] [0.223] [0.558] [0.296]
Fraud 0.009 0.977∗∗∗ 0.013 0.989∗∗∗ -0.396 1.253∗∗∗
[0.767] [0.329] [0.767] [0.329] [1.140] [0.414]
P-value, Founder incumbent
versus Nonfounder incumbent (0.280) (0.178) (0.342) (0.048)
Pseudo-R2 0.076 0.078 0.084
Firm-years 1,187 1,187 829
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Table 8
Methodology for estimating chief executive officer (CEO) compensation from new employment around bankruptcy.
The table describes the methodology used to estimate the CEO’s compensation in his new employment, which
includes remaining at the restructured firm after emerging from bankruptcy (see Fig. 1). The industry-size match
used for private firms in Panel B is as follows: The sales of the matched firm in ExecuComp must be within 30%
of the private firm’s sales. If sales are missing for the private firm, or no ExecuComp firm in the two-digit industry
has sales within the 30% band, the private firm is matched on assets using the same algorithm. If information on
assets is also missing, the match is on the number of employees. The sample size N indicates the number of cases
in each category after 63 cases with missing pre-departure total compensation are eliminated. The sample is 544
CEOs of 319 large public firms filing for Chapter 11 from 1996 to 2007.
Type of new employment N Methodology for estimating income at the new firm
Panel A: Executive at public firm
Remain CEO at restructured firm
emerging as public company
78 Actual compensation reported in ExecuComp, 10Ks or proxies.
Average of the pay in years Emergence+1 and Emergence+2 if
available, or else the pay in Emergence+1.
CEO at new public firm 20 Actual compensation reported in ExecuComp, 10Ks or proxies.
Average of the pay in the first two years of employment at the
new firm.
NonCEO executive at new public
firm
12 Average of the actual compensation in the first two years of
employment at the new firm from proxies or 10-Ks, or average
pay for the new firm’s nonCEO executives from ExecuComp.
Panel B: Executive at private firm
Remain CEO at restructured firm
emerging as private stand-alone firm
57 CEO pay for an industry-size matched firm in ExecuComp in
year Emergence+1, adjusted with a 20% private-firm discount.
CEO at new private firm 38 CEO pay for an industry-size matched firm in ExecuComp in
the first year of employment at the new firm, adjusted with a
20% private-firm discount.
NonCEO executive at new private
firm
28 NonCEO executive pay for an industry-size matched firm in
ExecuComp in the first year of employment at the new firm,
adjusted with a 20% private-firm discount.
Panel C: No new executive position
Nonexecutive director 75 Director pay estimated using regressions models 1-3 in Subsec-
tion 5.2, where the dependent variable is the average annual
non-executive director pay for firms in ExecuComp, 2005-2012.
Director pay estimate is the predicted value of one of the re-
gression models, as indicated in the text.
Consultant or self-employed 66 Total pay of $500,000 in 2009 dollars.
No new employment 170 An income of zero.
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Table 9
Median severance paid to chief executive officers (CEOs) departing around bankruptcy filing.
The table shows the median severance pay for departed CEOs in thousands of constant 2009 dollars, con-
ditional on receiving severance. Severance can be contractual or discretional, with discretional severance
negotiated at the time of departure. Total severance is reported in thousands of dollars and in percent
of the CEO’s compensation in the year prior to departure. The sample contains 447 departed CEOs at
277 large public US firms filing for Chapter 11 in the 1996 tot 2007 period who leave their positions in
(-2, Emergence+1). All variables are defined in Table 2. The P-values in parenthesis are from Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests for the difference in median. Data are from 10Ks, proxy statements, and news searches
in Factiva.
Percent of CEOs who Contractual Discretional Total severance
Sample N receive severance severance severance Dollars Percent
All departed CEOs 447 28 539 396 1,635 300
Severance categorized by subsequent employment
New full-time executive position 115 37 806 314 2,027 211
No new executive position 332 24 405 481 1,604 347
P-value of difference (0.006) (0.392) (0.341) (0.701) (0.328)
Severance categorized by incumbent versus replacement CEOs
Incumbent CEO 277 29 432 533 1,997 344
Replacement CEO 170 25 667 44 1,277 229
P-value of difference (0.411) (0.708) (0.045) (0.102) (0.368)
Severance categorized by forced versus voluntary turnover
Forced turnover 79 43 995 1,241 2,912 502
Voluntary turnover 368 24 452 313 1,290 225
P-value of difference (0.001) (0.293) (0.027) (0.002) (0.014)
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Table 10
Median chief executive officer (CEO) compensation change around bankruptcy filing.
The table shows the median CEO compensation change (in thousands of dollars and percent) and present
value (PV) compensation change (in thousands of dollars and as a multiple of the CEO’s old compen-
sation). Compensation change is the difference between the old income and new income, where the new
income is estimated as described in Table 8. For incumbent CEOs, the old compensation is averaged
over years -3 and -2 (or, when the income in year -3 is missing, it is the income in year -2 only). For
the replacement CEOs, the old compensation is averaged over the hiring year and the next (or, when the
income in the next year is missing, it is the income in the hiring year only). PV compensation change
is the present value of the compensation change through age 65, discounted at a 10% rate, and adjusted
for severance pay and time to new employment. The sample is 544 CEOs of 319 large public US firms
filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1996 to 2007. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The P-values are from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the difference
in median between incumbent CEOs and replacement CEOs.
Median compensation change Median PV compensation change
N Thousands of dollars Percent Thousands of dollars Multiple
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All CEOs maintaining executive employment
Incumbent CEOs 98 -51 -5 0 0.0
Replacement CEOs 135 262∗ 24∗∗∗ 674∗ 0.8∗∗∗
P-value of difference (0.052) (0.050) (0.111) (0.098)
CEOs remaining at restructured firm in Emergence+1
Incumbent CEOs 44 171 27 810 1.1∗∗
Replacement CEOs 91 262 16∗∗∗ 652 0.8∗∗
P-value of difference (0.583) (0.616) (0.782) (0.690)
CEOs departing to new executive position
Incumbent CEOs 54 -272 -22 -1,102∗ -1.5
Replacement CEOs 44 214 38∗∗∗ 1,040 2.1∗∗
P-value of difference (0.046) (0.056) (0.037) (0.032)
CEOs leaving the executive labor market
Incumbent CEOs 213 -1,609∗∗∗ -100∗∗∗ -7,235∗∗∗ -4.6∗∗∗
Replacement CEOs 98 -1,208∗∗∗ -100∗∗∗ -5,277∗∗∗ -5.3∗∗∗
P-value of difference (0.073) (0.831) (0.702) (0.168)
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Table 11
Determinants of the compensation change for chief executive officers (CEOs) maintaining executive em-
ployment around bankruptcy.
The table shows coefficient estimates from quantile (median) regressions of the compensation change (new
minus old compensation) for CEOs maintaining executive employment at the restructured firm emerging
from bankruptcy or at a new firm. The dependent variable is the percent compensation in Columns 1-4
and the present value (PV) of the compensation change as a multiple of the old compensation in Columns
5-8. The firm and bankruptcy characteristics are the same as in Table 6. The sample contains 231 CEOs
of large public US firms filing for Chapter 11 from 1996 to 2007. Included but not reported are Fama
and French 12 industry dummies and the regression constant term. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The P-values in parentheses are
from a χ2 test for the difference in the coefficients for Founder incumbent and Nonfounder incumbent.
All variables are defined in Table 2.
Percent compensation change PV compensation multiple
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.024 0.017 -0.031 0.017
[0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.017] [0.091] [0.089] [0.091] [0.093]
Chairman -0.292 -0.310 -0.318 -0.284 -1.692 -1.877 -1.525 -1.700
[0.197] [0.237] [0.199] [0.260] [1.393] [1.382] [1.393] [1.443]
Incumbent -0.452∗∗ -0.389 -1.873 0.287
[0.219] [0.281] [1.552] [1.639]
Founder incumbent -0.507 -0.132 -2.377 1.030
[0.390] [0.513] [2.721] [2.837]
Nonfounder incumbent -0.426∗ -0.384 -1.817 -0.448
[0.225] [0.313] [1.579] [1.738]
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankruptcy characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value, Founder incumbent
versus Nonfounder incumbent (0.832) (0.608) (0.833) (0.588)
Pseudo-R2 0.014 0.045 0.042 0.046 0.014 0.040 0.014 0.040
Observations 231 200 231 200 229 199 229 199
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Table 12
Determinants of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation prior to bankruptcy filing.
The table shows coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the logarithm of
CEO compensation (Models 1 and 2) and from Tobit regressions for the fraction of the compensation
paid in cash (Models 3 and 4). The sample contains 784 pre-filing firm-years (-3, -1) of large public
US firms filing for Chapter 11 from 1996-2007. Included but not reported are Fama and French 12
industry dummies and the regression constant term. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The P-values in parentheses are from a χ2
test for the difference in the coefficients for Founder incumbent and Nonfounder incumbent. All variables
are defined in Table 2.
Compensation in dollars (OLS) Fraction paid in cash (Tobit)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO characteristics
Age -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009y
[0.007] [0.007] [0.002] [0.002]
Chairman 0.030 0.013 -0.089∗∗ -0.083∗∗
[0.116] [0.116] [0.041] [0.041]
Share ownership -0.008∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.010y 0.010∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
Incumbent 0.433∗∗∗ 0.065
[0.131] [0.046]
Founder incumbent 0.620∗∗∗ -0.012
[0.181] [0.063]
Nonfounder incumbent 0.394∗∗∗ 0.082∗
[0.133] [0.047]
Firm characteristics
Size 0.253∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.024∗
[0.039] [0.039] [0.014] [0.014]
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.150 0.379 -0.094 -0.080
[0.531] [0.531] [0.190] [0.190]
Industry-adjusted leverage -0.048 -0.028 0.179∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
[0.175] [0.176] [0.066] [0.066]
Cash 1.085∗∗ 1.019∗∗ -0.057 -0.029
[0.467] [0.469] [0.164] [0.164]
Tangibility -0.182 -0.215 -0.017 -0.002
[0.278] [0.279] [0.097] [0.097]
Industry distress -0.418∗∗ -0.426∗∗ 0.100 0.103∗
[0.178] [0.178] [0.062] [0.062]
Bankruptcy characteristics
Prepack -0.380∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
[0.117] [0.118] [0.042] [0.042]
Fraud 0.719∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
[0.247] [0.247] [0.084] [0.084]
P-value, Founder incumbent
versus Nonfounder incumbent (0.134) (0.078)
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.123 0.124 0.099 0.101
Firm-years 784 784 784 784
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